


















by Uw e  Me ix n e r
Franz von Kutschera has recently proved the completeness of
“TxW-logic”: a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or
histories with the same time order1. In order to obtain this result,
he strengthened the object-language logic by (a modified version of)
Gabbay’s irreflexivity rule, and the completeness proof itself makes
crucial use of Gabbay’s irreflexivity lemma. This suggests that the
main obstacle to proving TxW-logic complete is the well known limited
power of expressibility of P.F-logic, ordinary tense logic -  a condition
that can in some measure be remedied by introducing Gabbay’s ir­
reflexivity rule.
1 Cf. Kutschera [1996]
Since this rule is a somewhat unwieldy item, this paper introduces
a tense-logical operator which — if added to P (“it was") and F (“it
will be’’), and provided the concept of a tense-logical valuation is mod­
ified in a certain way — allows to present a perspicuous formula that is
characteristic for the irreflexivity of the temporal ordering in ordinary
temporal frames. It is well known that there is no such formula, if
merely F and P are considered, and tense-logical valuations are stan­
dardly defined.
It also allows to present a formula which is characteristic for the
linearity of the temporal ordering in ordinary temporal frames (the
formula is a material implication that, rather pleasingly, is the con­
verse of a material implication characteristic for irreflexivity). Note
that PFA -> PAvAvFA is characteristic for right-linearity, and FFA ->
FAvAvFA characteristic for left-linearity; but linearity is not simply
the conjunction of right- and left-linearity, and therefore (PFA ->
PAvAvFA) A (FPA -> PAvAvFA) is not characteristic for linearity.
Consider the following temporal frame: two isolated time-points not
connected by a temporal relation; in other words, the temporal frame
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<T,R> consists of a set of two time-points T={ti,t?}, and a relation R
which is taken to be the empty set (the emptiness of R is not essential
for proving what is to be shown, but it makes the proof particularly
simple). It is easily seen that R is not linear on T: neither tiRti, nor
t2Rti, nor ti= t2; but, trivially, it is both right- and left-linear on T
(both “For all t,t',t" in T: if t"Rt and t"Rt', then tRt' or t'R t or t= t '”
and “For all t,t',t" in T: if tRt" and t'Rt", then tRt' or t'Rt or t= t '”
are trivially true), and according to standard semantics both F P \ ->
FAvAvFA and FFA -* FAvAvFA are true in <T,R> for any A.
How then is linearity expressed? The truth of the matter is that
there simply is no F,F-formula that expresses (full) linearity (the idea
for a simple proof of this can be can be gotten from Rescher/Urquhart
[1971, 120]). This seems to be much less generally known than the
inexpressibility of irreflexivity in P,F-logic. In any case, there is no
general feeling of a deficiency in P,F-logic due to the inexpressibility
of linearity, although linearity can hardly be said to be a less important
feature of time than irreflexivity.
Let L be a propositional language with the tense operators F, P and
A* (and the basic truth-functional operators -> and ->). N* is to be
read as “It is now, at this special moment t*, the case that”;
A*(A -> A), in particular, is to be read as “It is now this special mo­
ment t*”, or in other words “It is NOW” (and correspondingly A*p
may also be read as “It is NOW the case that”). Thus N* says neither
merely “it is now the case that”, nor merely “it is at the special mo­
ment t* the case that”. N* is the operator of implicitly dated presence.
(Note that someone who says “It is now, at this special moment t*,
the case that p” need not be able to specify t*, to identify it explicitly
as a specific date.) This operator is in fact used in ordinary language:
we sometimes say sentences of the following form: “It is NOW, and
A”, which is logically equivalent to A*A. More often we don’t actually
say such sentences, but rather are convinced of what they say: that it
is now, at this special moment t*, that such and such beautiful (or
terrible) things happen — the conviction of which is part and parcel
of a mode of feeling that might be termed “the feeling of the special­
ness of the presence” (a feeling that has a basis in the ontology of
time, although nobody will deny that there are countless moments of
time, and that they all are, have been or will be present).
Let <T,R> be a temporal frame; that is, T is a non-empty set of
time-points, R is a relation on T. The concept of a centered valuation
of L on <T,R> is defined as follows:
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DEFINITION 1:
V is a centered valuation of L on <T,R> := V is a function whose
domain is the union of TxL and {T}, and for which the following
conditions hold:
(i) V(T)eT;
(ii) for every formula A of L and every t in T: V(t,A)e{0,l};
(iii) for all formulae A and B of L and every t in T:
V(t,-iA)=l iffV(t,A)=0;
V(t,A->B)=l iff V(t,A)=0 or V(t,B)=l;
V(t,FA)=l iff there is a t' such that: tRt' and V(t',A)=l;
V(t,FA)=l iff there is a t' such that: t'Rt and V(t',A)=l;
V(t,A*A)=l iff t=V(T) and V(t,A)=L
Centered valuations of L on <T,R> differ from normal valuations
in having one extra element in their domain, namely T itself, from
which they select one element: their center; this special time-point is
then used for giving the truth condition for A*A.
With respect to centered valuations the formula 7V*p -» -iF7V*p can
be seen to be characteristic for temporal frames <T,R> where R is
irreflexive:
(1) Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, R being irreflexive; assume
there is a centered valuation V of L on <T,R> such that there is a te T
and V(t,/V*p -*■ - 1F7V*p)=0; hence V(t,A*p)=l and V(t,FA*p)=l;
hence t=V(T) and V(t,p)=l, and there is a t' such that t'Rt and
t' = V(T) and V(t',p)=l; from this we obtain tRt -  contradicting the
irreflexivity of R.
(2) Let <T.R> be a temporal frame, R being not irreflexive; hence
there is a t (in T) such that tRt; obviously there is a centered valuation
V of L on <T,R> such that V(T)=t and V(t.p)=l; hence V(t,7V*p)=l
and V(t,PA*p)=l (since tRt); hence V(t,A*p -> - 1PA*p)=0.
Thus we have:
THEOREM 1:
For every temporal frame <T,R>: R is irreflexive iff every centered
valuation of L on <T,R> verifies A'*p -> —JW*}) at every t in T.
A*p -► —>FV*p and A*(p-*p) -» (-1FA*(p-^p)A-iPA*(p->p)) would do
as well for characterizing irreflexivity. The converse of the latter for­
mula, however, is characteristic (with respect to centered valuations)
for temporal frames <T,R> where R is linear on T:
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(1) Let <T.R> be a temporal frame, R being linear on T; assume
there is a centered valuation V of L on <T.R> such that there is a te T
and V(t,-1FA^*(p^p))=l and V(t,->P7V*(p^p))= 1 and V(t,A*(p->p))
=0; by the linearity of R on T: R(V(T),t) or R(t,V(T)) or t=V(T);
since V(t,p->p)=l and V(t,7V*(p->p))=0: V(T)=#t; since V(V(T),
A*(p->p))=l and V(t,FA*(p-*p))=0 and V(t,PA*(p->p))=0, not
R(V(T),t) and not R(t,V(T)); hence the linearity of R on T is being
contradicted.
(2) Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, R not being linear on T; hence
there are t,t' in T such that neither tRt' nor t'R t nor t= t'; obviously
there is a centered valuation V of L on <T,R> with V(T)=t; hence
V(T)=#t' [else t=t'], hence V(t',7V*(p->p))=0; hence for every t": if
t"Rt', then t'W (T ) [else tRt'], hence V(t',—iP7V*(p->p))= 1; hence for
every t": if t'Rt", then t'W (T ) [else t'Rt], hence V(t',—>FAr*(p->p))=l.
Thus we have:
THEOREM 2:
For every temporal frame <T,R>: R is linear on T iff every centered
valuation of L on <T,R> verifies (-iP7V*(p->p)A—iFV*(p-»p)) -»
7V*(p->p) at every t in T.
The next question is of course, how the logic of P,F and N* is
to be adequately axiomatized (with respect to centered valuations).
Consider minimally adequate temporal frames, that is, temporal frames
<T,R> where R is transitive, irreflexive and linear on T.
DEFINITION 2:
B is a valid* formula of L := B is a formula of L such that for all T,R
and V: if <T,R> is a minimally adequate temporal frame and V is a
centered valuation of L on <T,R>, then for every t in T: V(t,B)=l.
The axiomatic system S* (specified below) can easily be seen to be
sound with respect to valid* formulae of L (and I conjecture that it is
also complete). S* is obtained by adding to the appropriate P,F-basis
for linear time (including truth-functional propositional logic based
on -i and ->) the following axiom-schemata:
N*1 A*A-»A
N*2 A*B -  (A-A*A)
N*3 A* A -> -iPA*A, A* A -  -,FA*A
N*4 -.PA*(A-A) -  (—iFA*(A-»A)-»A*(A->A))
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The following schemata of formulae, for example, are then provable
in S*:
(B-»A) -  (A*B-A*A)
A* A ~  A* A* A
A* A — (Aa A*(p - p ))2
2 This schema makes it very easy to prove 7V*(Aa B) — (A*Aa /V*B). <V*(Av B) «—
(A*AvA*B).
3 The latter two formulae express irreflexivity!
~^N*FN*A
^N*PN*A3
(- IPA*AA-.FA*AA-1P-A.A-1F-nAAA) -  A*A
(—FA*Aa —FA*—A a —iPA*Aa —iPA*—iAa ->A*—A) — A*A.
No formula A* A is provable in S*. Else A*(p->p) would also be
provable in S*; but A*(p—p) is not a valid* formula of L, and S* is
sound with respect to validity* (only valid* formulae of L are provable
in S*). It is interesting to see what happens if A*(p-»p) is added to S*.
Then A*A A becomes provable (by N*1 and N*2); but given this,
p -* -iFp and p -» —Fp become provable as well (by N*3). Both these
formulae are characteristic of temporal frames <T,R> in which R is
empty. Consider p -> -,Pp:
(1) Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, R being empty; assume there is
a centered valuation V of L on <T,R> such that there is a t in T with
V(t,p)=l and V(t,-iPp)=0; hence V(t,Pp)=l, hence there is a t' with
t'Rt -  but this contradicts the emptiness of R.
(2) Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, R not being empty; hence there
is a t and a t' such that t'Rt; obviously there is a centered valuation V
of L on <T,R> with V(t,p)=l and V(t',p)=l; hence V(t,Pp)=l, hence
V(t,p->-Fp)=0.
A*(p“»p) itself is characteristic of temporal frames <T,R> in which
T contains precisely one element:
(1) Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, T containing precisely one ele­
ment; assume there is a centered valuation V of L on <T,R> such that
there is a t in T with V(t,A*(p->p))=0; hence V(T)=#t; but this, since
V(T)eT, contradicts T’s containing precisely one element.
(2) Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, T not containing precisely one
element; hence there are t, t' in T and t F t' (T is non-empty); obviously
there is a centered valuation V of L on <T,R> with V(T)=t; hence
V(t',A*(p-p))=0.
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All this fits very well. For if <T,R> is a temporal frame with T
containing precisely one element, then R is trivially linear on T; and
then R is irreflexive iff R is empty. Correspondingly: by adding
7V*(p-*p) to S* we obtain a system in which N*4 is a trivial theorem,
and in which N*3 -  the axiom-schemata characteristic for irreflexivity
— can be equivalently replaced by A -» —.FA and A -* —JA , which
are the axiom-schemata characteristic for emptiness. Moreover, the
emptiness of R trivially implies the transitivity of R, which is expressed
by formulae of the form FFA -* FA, FFA -» FA; and correspondingly
we have: since -.FA is provable in S* + AT*(p->p) [assume FA, hence
F(p-»p), hence by the contraposition of B -.FB: ->(p->p) -  which is
a contradiction], -.FFA is also provable in S* + jV*(p-*p) [-.FFA is an
instance of —.FA]; hence, trivially, FFA -> FA is provable in
S* + A'*(p-p).
Clearly, the addition of 7V*(p->p) to S* trivializes the system. Yet,
in a manner, 7V*(p-»p) could very well be regarded as a valid formula
of L, and it is one, if we introduce an alternative definition of validity:
DEFINITION 3:
B is a valid + formula of L := B is a formula of L such that for all T,
R and V: if <T,R> is a minimally adequate temporal frame and V a
centered valuation of L on <T,R>, then V(V(T),B)= 1.
Obviously any valid* formula of L is a valid +  formula of L, but
not vice versa: 7V*(p-»p) is a case in point. But although S*, we may
assume, is sound and complete with respect to the valid* formulae of
L, there can be no adequate axiomatization of the valid + formulae
of L that is simply an extension of S*; for S* includes the rule
A -iF-.A , and while this is a rule that preserves validity*, it is not a
rule that preserves validity+: while 7V*(p-»p) is valid+ , —.F-.7V*(p-»p)
is not: there are of course T, R and V such that <T,R> is a minimally
adequate temporal frame and V a centered valuation of L on <T,R>
and V(V(T),F-.AT*(p->p))=l.
By considering validity + besides validity*, I have started a parade
of alternatives to the semantical approach first presented by me. N o­
tice next, that we can define in L: NOW :=  7V*(p-»p) (“NOW ” is not
a term, but a formula which is to be read as “ It is NOW ”; compare
the fifth paragraph of this paper). But taking “NOW ” as basic in a
language L ' which is otherwise like L, we might as well define in L ':
A*A := NOW a A, and change the definition of centered valuations
accordingly: “V(t,NOW )=l iff t=V (T )” instead of “V(t,7V*A)= 1 iff
It is NOW 199
t=V(T) and V(t,A)=l”. Maybe the second way is even more natural
than the first, but it certainly is more elegant: we can drop without
replacement axioms N*1 and N*2, N*3 becomes NOW -> -iFNOW,
NOW -> —iPNOW, and N*4 -,FNOW -> (-.FNOW -> NOW). As a
theorem we have NOW «—■ (—.FNOW A -nFNOW): “It is NOW iff it
never was NOW. and never will be".4
4 Clearly, “It is NOW the case that” says something different from Kamp's “It is Now
the case that'’: for Kamp's “Now” we have as a logical truth “ If it is Now the case
that A, then it always will be Now the case that A” (compare Burgess [1984. 124]);
this is not a logical truth for “NOW”. On the other hand, “If it is NOW the case
that A. then it never will be NOW the case that A” is a logical truth for “NOW”,
but not for “Now”. Both uses of “now” — in the sense of “Now” and in the sense
of “NOW” -  occur in ordinary language, but “NOW” seems not to have been
noticed so far by logical semantics.)
I have used ordinary temporal frames, but centered valuations.
Why not use ordinary valuations, but centered temporal frames?
DEFINITION 4:
A centered temporal frame is a triple <T,R,x> consisting of a non­
empty set T (of time-points), a relation R on T, and a special element
x of T.
Let <T,R,x> be a centered temporal frame.
DEFINITION 5:
V is a valuation of L on <T,R.x> := V is a function whose domain is
TxL and for which the following conditions hold: [the rest is like defi­
nition 1, except that clause (i) is dropped, and that the condition for
N* now reads: “V(t,A*A)=l iff t=x, and V(t,A)=l”; if we refer to L'
instead of L, we have “V(t,NOW)=l iff t=x”].
DEFINITION 6:
B is a valid formula of L := B is a formula of L, and for all T,R,x,V:
if <T,R,x> is a minimally adequate centered temporal frame and V a
valuation of L on <T,R,x>, then for every t in T: V(t,B)=l.
Indeed, why not base the whole affair on these three definitions
instead? For we have:
THEOREM 3:
B is a valid formula of L iff B is a valid* formula of L.
The proof of this is rather obvious. However, on the basis of defini­
tions 4 and 5 we cannot retrieve the expressibility results obtained
200 Uwe Meixner
above. It is true that N*p->->FN*p is valid in every centered temporal
frame <T.R,x> where R is irreflexive; but it is not true that R is irre-
flexive for every centered temporal frame <T,R,x> in which
7V*p-*-iFA*p is valid. Consider the frame <T,R,x> := <{t,x},{<t,t>},x>
(x is a time-point that is not identical to t). It is easily verified that
<T.R,x> is a centered temporal frame for which R is not irreflexive;
but nevertheless for every valuation V of L on <T,R,x> and every t'
in T: V(t',N*p->—<FN*p)=\: t' must be either t or x; if it is x, then
V(t',-iFA)=l, since there is no t" such that xRt", hence
V(t/ ,7V*p-^-iF7V*p)=l; if it is t, then V(t',jV*A)=0, since t#=x, hence
V(t',7V*p— .FV*p)=l.
Also: it is true that (->FNOWa - iFNOW) -> NOW is valid in every
centered temporal frame <T,R,x> where R is linear on T; but it is not
true that R is linear on T for every centered temporal frame <T,R.x>
in which (-iFNOWa —iFNOW) -> NOW is valid. Consider the frame
<T,R,x> ;= <{t,t',x},{<t,x>,<t',x>},x> (t and t' are time-points differing
from each other and from x). It is easily seen that <T,R,x> is a centered
temporal frame for which R is not linear on T, but that nevertheless
(-FNOW a -FNOW) -> NOW is valid in it.
This shows that centered valuations of L plus ordinary temporal
frames are equivalent to ordinary valuations of L plus centered tempo­
ral frames with respect to logical truth, but not with respect to the
expression o f frame-properties. Other things being equal, it is clear that
centered valuations of L plus ordinary temporal frames should be
preferred on account of their greater ability in expressing these proper­
ties.
But centered valuations of L plus ordinary temporal frames are
entirely equivalent to ordinary temporal frames plus double-indexed
valuations. Let <T,R> be a temporal frame:
DEFINITION 7:
V is a double-indexed valuation of L on <T,R> := V is a function
whose domain is TxTxL and for which the following conditions hold:
(i) for all t,t 'eT  and every formula A of L: V(t,t'. A) e {!,()};
(ii) for all t,t' eT  and all formulae A and B of L:
V(t,t',~iA)= 1 iff V(t,t',A)=0,
V(t,t',A-»B)=l iff V(t,t',A)=0 or V(t,t',B)=l,
V(t,t',FA)=I iff for some t": t'Rt" and V(t,t",A)=l;
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V(t,t',PA)=l iff for some t": t"Rt' and V(t,t",A)=l,
V(t,t',7V*A)=l iff t '= t  and V(t,t',A)=l.5
5 Compare the truth-condition for N* with that for Kamp's Now, for which double­
indexed valuations were first introduced: “V(t.t',JA)=l iff V(t,t,A)= 1”.
It is easily checked that the expressibility results available for cen­
tered valuations of L are also available for double-indexed valuations.
(For example: Let <T,R> be a temporal frame, such that R is not linear
on T; hence there are time-points t and t' in T such that neither tRt'
nor t'R t nor t= t'. Then V(t,t',NOW)=0, since t '^ t;  V(t,t',FNOW)=0,
since there is no t" with t'Rt" and V(t,t",NOW) = 1 [else t"=t and t'Rt];
V(t,t',PNOW)=0, since there is no t" with t"Rt' and V(t,t",NOW)= 1
[else t"=t and tRt'].)
Moreover we have:
THEOREM 4:
For any formula B of L: If <T.R> is a minimally adequate temporal
frame and V a double-indexed valuation of L on <T,R> and t,t' ele­
ments of T with V(t.t'.B)=0, then there is a temporal frame <T*,R*>
which is isomorphic to <T.R> [hence minimally adequate] and a cen­
tered valuation V* of L on <T*,R*> such that for <t,t'> in T*:
V*«t,t'>,B)=0.
Proof:
Let B be a formula of L, <T,R> a minimally adequate temporal frame,
t and t' elements of T, V a double-indexed valuation of L on <T,R>
with V(t,t',B)=0. T* := {t}xT; xR*y := there are ti,ti in T such that
x=<t,ti> and y=<t,t2> and ti Rt2; there is no difficulty in showing that
<T*,R*> is a temporal frame that is isomorphic to <T.R>. We stipulate
V* to be a function whose domain is T*xL. and such that for any
<t,t"> in T* and any A of L: V*«t,t">,A) = V(t,t",A), and such that
V*(T*)=<t,t>; there is no difficulty in showing that V* is a centered
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Let B be a formula of L, <T,R> a minimally adequate temporal frame,
t an element of T, V a centered valuation of L on <T,R> with
V(t,B)=0. We associate any t' in T with a centered valuation V[t'] of
L on <T.R> such that V[t'](T)=t', and such that V[V(T)]=V. We stipu­
late V* to be a function whose domain is TxTxL, and such that for
any t',t" in T and any formula A of L: V*(t',t",A) = V[t'](t",A). V* is
a double-indexed valuation of L on <T.R>:
Assume t',t" are in T, A a formula of L; consider the interesting
cases:
V*(t',t",FA)=l iff V[t'](t",FA)=l iff there is a t'" such that t"Rt"'
and V[t'](t"',A)= 1 iff there is a t"' such that t"Rt"' and V*(t', t"',A)= 1;
V*(t',t",7V*A)=l iff V[t'](t",7V*A)=l iff t"=V[t'](T) and
V[t'](t",A)= 1 iff t"=t' and V(t',t",A)=L
And we have V*(V(T),t.B)=V[V(T)](t.B)=V(t.B)=0.
Theorems 4 and 5 also hold true if we add, as is surely desirable,
Kamp’s Now (J) to L (for centered valuations V of L on a temporal
frame <T,R> we then have for any teT: V(t,JA)=l iff V(V(T),A)= 1,
and is valid* for any formula A of L). This shows that
centered valuations do as well as double-indexed valuations in the se­
mantical treatment of Kamp’s Now.
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